網頁

Translate

2015年8月31日 星期一

陶傑教英語: ''Letter to Hong Kong'' -- Dr.Michael Degolyer

  Letter to Hong Kong 

Dr.Michael Degolyer 10 Sep , 2000

  "Why bother to vote? Legco can't do anything!" I've heard that more than once. I'm sure you have too. While a common impression, it's just not true.

  Correct, parties elected to Legco won't form the government. At least, they won't take over the administrative arm like a majority party or coalition would in normal parliamentary elections.  

  True, a party or coalition winning a majority won't even necessarily get seats to the Executive Council (Exco), the appointed body "advising" the Chief Executive on the making of policy. The Chief Executive could rule without any political group having the weak privilege of "advising" him on a regular, formal basis. The few elected members appointed to Exco get caught up in a colonial-era tradition of collective responsibility and collective secrecy. None of the discussions in Exco can be publicly discussed, much less disputed. Decisions, once made, "bind" Exco members to support them in public and in the legislature.

  It's not something a party holding a majority in Legco would want to commit to. Binding support, but no control, no insured majority on Exco. Worse, under today's rules, any policy adopted "belongs" to the whole Exco, thus a party with representatives but no control might win in getting a policy adopted, but receive no credit for the policy as a party-backed idea. Certainly an unattractive proposition to parties needing to carve out an identity and forge relationships with voters. One bad Exco decision they didn't even like or control, but couldn't denounce, and the party's dead at the polls. No party is stupid enough to fall for that, especially when the current Chief Executive has all the political instincts of a dead fish. And so we're stuck with an Exco that makes policy without very much legitimacy, while Legco, with a lot more legitimacy, sits in frustration, unable to makes its mandate, given by hundreds of thousands of voters, effective.

  True as well, the 24 members returned by geographic constituencies don't form a majority in the 60 seat Legco. And on many bills, Legco breaks into a quasi-upper house and lower house arrangement in which a "majority" of both directly elected geographic members and of functional constituency members must agree in order to pass or block a bill from the executive branch. Technically 16 functional constituency members, "elected" to Legco by a few thousand votes, many of them "corporate votes" of very dubious legitimacy, could form a blocking vote and stop the entire balance of Legco, at 44 members a clear majority, dead in its tracks.

  All true. Clearly this is not a democratic government, and thus not subject to the will of the people expressed at the ballot box. So why bother to vote?

  First, it doesn't have to be this way. Second, it's not going to stay this way. Third, it's not even this way now. Excuse me? It's not that way now, you say?

  That's right. Three times in the first SAR legislature Legco forced action onto a reluctant Executive.

  The first time came just after the first SAR election in May 1998. While the government seemed blissfully unaware of the depths of economic pain being suffered, Legco members who had just spent weeks in intense, face to face discussion with the public during the election campaign knew precisely how the public felt. An "all party" coalition commanding an overwhelming majority formed to propose action on the economic crisis. And presto! The administration came up in just days with a package of emergency measures meant to jump-start the economy, alleviate acute economic distress, and create more rapidly jobs derived from public expenditure, particularly on infrastructure. Plans for, then negotiations on bringing Disney to Hong Kong took on new, vigorous life.

  All because a clear majority, in both "houses" of Legco, demanded action and commanded the votes to compel it.

  The second time came with an "all-party" coalition on the environment. Again, the public had made it acutely clear that something urgently had to be done about choking air pollution. Again, the executive branch, stung to action, came up with a series of emergency measures, including, finally, enforcing laws long on the books against the cheap, dirty diesel smuggled in from the mainland. A few embarrassing visits by Christine Loh to some of the illegal diesel selling sites, owned and leased by the government, and suddenly civil servants got off it and used the powers lying inert in their hands.

  In both these cases the Chief Executive had expressed public interest or concern on the issues prior to legislative pressure. He had spent an hour on the environment in his October 1999 Policy Address, only to be denounced for making it such a priority by many of the same Legco member who later joined the coalition. So while Legco action certainly speeded up things, it didn't fundamentally alter directions. True. But on the third item, Legco clearly forced matters onto an extremely adverse Chief Executive.

  When the housing scandals broke, the public ignited in fury. With nearly half living in public housing and the Home Ownership Scheme sucking down millions of dollars of public subsidies, and pressures on the budget abounding, that hundreds of millions stood to be lost due to waste, fraud, neglectful oversight, lack of coordination, and not using technically qualified experts for inspections just seemed intolerable. Yet another whitewashing executive investigation, like that into the myriad start-up problems with the airport, just couldn't be accepted, especially with an election only a few months away. And so another all-party coalition began to form to call for, and back, a vote of no confidence in Housing Authority head and Exco member Rosanna Wong. For the first time in Hong Kong's history, a prominent member of government resigned under pressure, against the express wishes of the Chief Executive.

  Clearly, even with a dubiously elected first Chief Executive and with a deliberately fragmented Legco, significant expressions of public sentiment generate action. This election will strengthen the capability of Legco to act, if it wishes and if the public makes that clear at the polls.

  That means, if YOU make that clear at the polls.

  The political parties could form coalitions and control a majority in both Legco voting blocs. This would compel cooperation from the administration, as has been clearly demonstrated. Results from two recent surveys by the Hong Kong Transition Project show that majorities or large portions of the public clearly associate certain issues and stances with certain parties. Even without "credit" from Exco, the public clearly knows who originated and pushed various policies. If parties became more policy generating, policy backing and public energizing bodies rather than just reactive, always-barking "watch dogs" they would have more effect, on government and at the polls.

  Finally, every single member elected today will vote on the next Chief Executive, to be elected in a few months time. On the 800 member Election Committee sit hundreds of party members, and for the first time, this Election Committee or one like it, a body with a majority of elected members, will vote on a Chief Executive.

  Even a Chief Executive who hates politics will have to learn how politics works, if he wants to keep his job for a second term. Politics works by forming policy-supporting majorities, sharing responsibility and credit with those who will back the policies, by making directors and those implementing policies accountable to the public and legislature, and by respecting the votes and views of Legco and party members. It won't be long before the executive branch learns to work with the legislative branch and political parties, or be taken over by them.

  Make no mistake, political structures are in a process of change in Hong Kong. Your vote today is a way of speeding that up, by voting for those who want such changes at a faster pace, or slowing it down, by voting in those who oppose moves toward more accountable, effective government. And if you just sit at home today, you automatically support things to stay in the current stalemate, a stalemate broken by intermittent action only when the public gets furious about something not being done or being done badly.

  This isn't a good idea. People in large groups, really angry about something, tend to get of hand. We need structures of governance that act long before people are furiously pouring into the streets. And don't say it can't happen here. It has, more than once. At least 7 times in the 20th century Hong Kong was rocked by strikes, mass marches, general boycotts, a general strike that lasted over a year, and more than once by riots.

  So get up and go vote if you haven't already. Or call friends and make sure they've voted or plan to vote. If well over a million people vote, that alone sends a message that we want the system fixed, and we want a government that works, together, with us, consulting us, listening to us and our elected representatives.

  If you don't vote and leave things like they are, a situation where the government isn't working very well, don't complain when the demonstrations and riots start. Your inaction left that as the only alternative.

END

一個卓越的演說家除了口才凌厲和文辭精彩之外,最重要是態度誠懇,即使舌燦蓮花,但若態度虛偽輕浮,令人一眼看出是政客所為,演說效果就會大打折扣。所以政治家必須是一個出色的演說家,也要是一個優秀的演員。

  今次介紹的是香港電台英文台的一篇香港家書,由香港浸會大學政治及國際關係學系副教授戴高禮(Michael Degolyer)主講,內容主要是大力推銷投票、民主的好處。

  這次演說的對象是香港人,並非有悠久民主及投票歷史的歐美國家人民。正如馬丁路德金所運用的技巧一樣,演說者對不同階層的人要講不同的說話,為了遷就香港人的口味,戴高禮像向一班對民主完全無知的幼稚園程度學生解畫,他這樣說︰

  Your vote today is a way of speeding that up, by voting for those who want such changes at a faster pace, or slowing it down, by voting in those who oppose moves toward more accountable, effective government. 也就是說,無論你希望社會改變與否,你也要用投票的方式來表達。

  戴高禮的演說有一個特色,就是用了英文中的委婉語Euphemism,亦即不用一些太刺激的字眼,如謀殺、搶劫、非禮等,改用較婉轉的方式表達,例如︰

  And if you just sit at home today, you automatically support things to stay in the current stalemate, a stalemate broken by intermittent action only when the public gets furious about something not being done or being done badly. 戴高禮用the public gets furious about something一串字,代表了民怨和不滿,就是用了英語的委婉語效果。

  又如︰This isn't a good idea. People in large groups, really angry about something, tend to get of hand. We need structures of governance that act long before people are furiously pouring into the streets. 在這段落中,他又用了委婉語,people are furiously pouring into the streets,指的是抗議、騷亂、暴動,但他在演講中先不說出,留待最後才說。

  戴高禮在結尾時說︰If you don't vote and leave things like they are, a situation where the government isn't working very well, don't complain when the demonstrations and riots start. Your inaction left that as the only alternative. 他最後才用一些較激烈的字眼,如示威(demonstrations)、暴動(riots)等,這樣做,可在演講中慢慢建立一種節奏,將力量逐漸加強,這是戴高禮演說引人入勝之處。

  英語的委婉詞在日常生活中非常重要,英國是一個階級分明的國家,而且亦是一個講究禮儀的社會,即使批評對方,也要花心思,用間接影射的方式,令對方或第三者會心微笑,而避免用一些赤裸裸或太直接的字眼,刺激對方。

  英國議會多年前發生過一件趣事,一位議員攻擊另一位反對黨的議員說謊,他當時這樣說︰The right honourable gentleman is a liar. 下議院議長指其犯規,要驅逐離場,因為英語中liar(說謊者)是非常嚴重的侮辱,他立即道歉並更正自己的說話︰The right honourable gentleman is being economical with truth. (這位議員朋友只是對真理較為吝惜而已)

  他把 liar 改為 being economical with truth,令不少下議院的議員哄堂大笑,佩服他的急才和急智,可見在演說和說話中,適當運用委婉語的技巧,效果立竿見影。 


沒有留言:

張貼留言